On the Secrecy Capacity of Block Fading Channels with a Hybrid Adversary by Basciftci, Y. Ozan et al.
On the Secrecy Capacity of Block Fading
Channels with a Hybrid Adversary
Y. Ozan Basciftci, Onur Gungor, C. Emre Koksal, Fusun Ozguner
Abstract
We consider a block fading wiretap channel, where a transmitter attempts to send messages securely to a receiver
in the presence of a hybrid half-duplex adversary, which arbitrarily decides to either jam or eavesdrop the transmitter-
to-receiver channel. We provide bounds to the secrecy capacity for various possibilities on receiver feedback and
show special cases where the bounds are tight. We show that, without any feedback from the receiver, the secrecy
capacity is zero if the transmitter-to-adversary channel stochastically dominates the effective transmitter-to-receiver
channel. However, the secrecy capacity is non-zero even when the receiver is allowed to feed back only one bit at
the end of each block. Our novel achievable strategy improves the rates proposed in the literature for the non-hybrid
adversarial model. We also analyze the effect of multiple adversaries and delay constraints on the secrecy capacity.
We show that our novel time sharing approach leads to positive secrecy rates even under strict delay constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study point-to-point block fading channels, depicted in Figure 1, in the presence of a hybrid adversary. The
hybrid half-duplex adversary can choose to either eavesdrop or jam the transmitter-receiver channel, but not both
at a given block. The goal of the transmitter is to communicate a message reliably to the receiver while keeping
it asymptotically secret from the hybrid adversary. During the communication, the state of the adversary (jamming
or eavesdropping) changes in an arbitrary manner from one block to the next and is unknown to the transmitter.
We further assume that the transmitter has no channel state information (CSI) of the transmitter-to-receiver channel
(main channel), the transmitter-to-adversary channel (eavesdropper channel) and the adversary-to-receiver channel
(jamming channel). The receiver has perfect causal CSI of the main and jamming channels. We study the secrecy
capacity of this setting when (i) there is no receiver-to-transmitter feedback, and (ii) there is 1-bit of receiver-to-
transmitter feedback sent at the end of each block.
The main challenge in our problem stems from the fact that simultaneously maintaining reliability and secrecy is
difficult because of the adversary’s arbitrary strategy in choosing its state, i.e., jamming or eavesdropping, at each
block. If we design a scheme focusing on a particular adversary strategy, with a slight change in that particular
strategy, the adversary can cause a decoding error or a secrecy leakage. For instance, if our scheme assumes a
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fully eavesdropping adversary, then jamming even in a small fraction of the time will lead to a decoding error.
Likewise, if the scheme is designed against a full jammer, then the adversary will lead to a secrecy leakage even
it eavesdrops for a small fraction of time. A robust scheme should take into account the entire set of adversary
strategies to maintain reliability and secrecy. Our technical contributions are summarized as follows:
• We show that the secrecy capacity is zero when the receiver feedback is not available and the eavesdropper
channel stochastically dominates the effective main channel gain. However, we also show that even one bit of
receiver feedback at the end of each block is sufficient to make the secrecy capacity positive for almost all
possible channel distributions.
• Under an arbitrary adversarial strategy, the receiver cannot employ a well known typical set decoder [16] since
it cannot assume a certain distribution for the received signal. To that end, we propose a receiver strategy in
which the receiver generates artificial noise and adds it to the received signal (i.e., jams itself to involve typical
set decoding [16]). We show special cases in which artificial noise generation at the receiver is an optimal
way to achieve the secrecy capacity.
• For the 1-bit receiver feedback case, we propose a proof technique for the equivocation analysis, that is based
on renewal theory. By this technique, we can improve the existing achievable secrecy rates in [15], which
focus on passive eavesdropping attacks only. Note that our adversary model covers the possibility of a full
eavesdropping attack as well since it allows for the adversary to eavesdrop (or jam) for an arbitrary fraction
of the time.
• We bound the secrecy capacity when there are multiple hybrid adversaries. The challenge in bounding the
secrecy capacity for multiple adversaries scenario stems from the fact that, when an adversary jams the
legitimate receiver, it also interferes to the other adversaries as well. However, we show that the impact
of the interference of one adversary to another adversary does not appear in the bounds, which results in a
tighter upper bound. Furthermore, the bounds we provide are valid for the cases in which the adversaries
collude or do not collude. In the non-colluding case, we show that the secrecy capacity bounds are determined
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2by the adversary that has the strongest eavesdropper channel.
In addition to the aforementioned set-up, we also consider a delay limited communication in which a message of
fixed size arrives at the encoder at the beginning of each block, and it needs to be transmitted reliably and securely
by the end of that particular block. Otherwise, secrecy outage occurs at that block. We analyze delay limited capacity
subject to a secrecy outage constraint. We employ a time sharing strategy in which we utilize a portion of each
block to generate secret key bits and use these key bits as a supplement to secure the delay sensitive messages
that are transmitted in the other portion of each block. Our scheme achieves positive delay limited secrecy rates
whenever the secrecy capacity without any delay constraint is positive.
Related Work: The wiretap channel, introduced by Wyner [1], models information theoretically secure message
transmission in a point-to-point setting, where a passive adversary eavesdrops the communication between two
legitimate nodes by wiretapping the legitimate receiver. While attempting to decipher the message, no limit is
imposed on the computational resources available to the eavesdropper. This assumption led to defining (weak)
secrecy capacity as the maximum achievable rate subject to zero mutual information rate between the transmitted
message and the signal received by the adversary. This work was later generalized to the non-degraded scenario [2]
and the Gaussian channel [3]. By exploiting the stochasticity and the asymmetry of wireless channels, the recent
works [4], [5] extended the results in [1], [2], [3] to a variety of scenarios involving fading channels. However, all
of the mentioned works consider a passive adversary that can only eavesdrop.
There is a recent research interest on hybrid adversaries that can either jam or eavesdrop [12], [13], [14]. In [13],
the authors formulate the wiretap channel as a two player zero-sum game in which the payoff function is an
achievable ergodic secrecy rate. The strategy of the transmitter is to send the message in a full power or to utilize
some of the available power to produce artificial noise. The conditions under which pure Nash equilibrium exists
are studied. In [12], the authors consider fast fading main and eavesdropper channels and a static jammer channel,
where the adversary follows an ergodic strategy such that it jams or eavesdrop with a certain probability in each
channel use. Under this configuration, they propose a novel encoding scheme, called block-Markov Wyner secrecy
encoding. In [14], the authors introduce a pilot contamination attack in which the adversary jams during the reverse
training phase to prevent the transmitter from estimating the channel state correctly. The authors show the impact of
the pilot contamination attack on the secrecy performance. Note that, neither of these works consider an adversary
that has an arbitrary strategy to either jam or eavesdrop, which is the focus of this paper.
Channels under arbitrary jamming (but no eavesdropping) strategies have been studied in the context of arbitrary
varying channel (AVC). AVC, the concept of which is introduced in [6], is defined to be the communication channel
the statistics of which change in an arbitrary and unknown manner during the transmission of information. In [8], the
authors derive the capacity for Gaussian AVCs, memoryless Gaussian channels disrupted by a jamming signal that
changes arbitrarily with unknown statistics. An extensive treatment of AVCs, outlining the challenges and existing
approaches can be found in [7]. Recently, discrete memoryless AVCs with a secrecy constraint and no receiver
feedback have been studied in [9] [10], where the states of the channels to the both receiver and the eavesdropper
remain unknown to the legitimate pair and change in an arbitrary manner under the control of the adversary. The
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3achievable secrecy rates they propose are zero when the worst possible transmitter-to-receiver channel is a degraded
version of the best possible transmitter-to-adversary channel. On the other hand, in addition to the jamming signal
of the adversary, we consider the fading channels whose states cannot be completely controlled by the adversary.
We show the secrecy capacity is zero when the main channel gain is stochastically dominated by the eavesdropper
channel gain. Furthermore, under arbitrarily small receiver feedback rate (1-bit at the end of each block), we show
that the secrecy capacity is non-zero.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain the system model. In Section III, we
present the secrecy capacity bounds for the no feedback case, and in Section IV, we consider the 1-bit feedback
case. In Section V, we study the multiple adversaries case. In Section VI, we present our results related to the strict
delay setting. In Section VII, we present our numerical results and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the communication system illustrated in Figure 1. In our system a transmitter has a message w ∈ W
to transmit to the receiver over the main channel. The adversary chooses to either jam the receiver over the jammer
channel or eavesdrop it over the eavesdropping channel. The actions of the adversary is parametrized by the state,
φ(i) of a switch, shown in Figure 1. Thus, our system consists of three channels: main, eavesdropper and jammer
channels, all of which are block fading. In the block fading channel model, time is divided into discrete blocks
each of which contains N channel uses. The channel states are assumed to be constant within a block and vary
independently from one block to the next. We assume the adversary is half duplex, i.e., the adversary can not jam
and eavesdrop simultaneously. The observed signals at the legitimate and the adversary in i-th block are as follows:
Y N (i) = Gm(i)x
N (i) +Gz(i)S
N
j (i)φ(i) + S
N
m(i) (1)
ZN (i) =
Ge(i)x
N (i) + SNe (i) if φ(i) = 0
∅ if φ(i) = 1
(2)
where xN (i) is the transmitted signal, Y N (i) is the signal received by the legitimate receiver, ZN (i) is the
signal received by the adversary, SNj (i), S
N
m(i), and S
N
e (i) are noise vectors distributed as complex Gaussian,
CN(0, PjIN×N ), CN(0, IN×N ), and CN(0, IN×N ), respectively, and Pj is the jamming power. Indicator function
φ(i) = 1 if the adversary is in a jamming state in i-th block; otherwise, φ(i) = 0. Channel gains, Gm(i),
Ge(i), and Gz(i) are defined to be the complex gains of the main channel, eavesdropper channel, and jammer
channel, respectively (as illustrated in Figure 1). Associated power gains are denoted with Hm(i) = |Gm(i)|2,
He(i) = |Ge(i)|2, and Hz(i) = |Gz(i)|2. For any integer M > 0, the joint probability density function (pdf) of(
GMm , G
M
e , G
M
z
)
is
pGMm ,GMe ,GMz
(
gMm , g
M
e , g
M
z
)
(3)
=
M∏
i=1
pGm,Ge,Gz (gm(i), ge(i), gz(i)) . (4)
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4Here, gm(i), ge(i), and gz(i) are the realizations of Gm(i), Ge(i), and Gz(i), respectively. We assume that the joint
pdf of instantaneous channel gains, pGm,Ge,Gz (gm, ge, gz) is known by all entities. The transmitter does not know
the states of any channel, and also cannot observe the strategy of the adversary in any given block. The adversary
and the receiver know ge(i) and (gm(i), gz(i)), respectively at the end of block i. The receiver can observe the
instantaneous strategy of the adversary, φ(i) in block i (e.g., via obtaining the presence of jamming) only at the
end of block i. We generalize some of our results to the case in which the receiver cannot observe gz(i).
We consider two cases in which feedback from the receiver to the transmitter is not available or some limited
feedback is available. In particular, in the latter case, we consider a 1-bit feedback over an error-free public channel
at the end of each block. We denote the feedback sent at j-th time instant as k(j).
For the 1-bit feedback case, k(j) is an element of {0, 1} and is a function of (yj , gim, giz, φi) if time instant j
corresponds to the end of a block, i.e., j = iN for any block index i ≥ 1. For other time instants, the receiver does
not send feedback: k(j) = ∅ if j 6= iN for all i ≥ 1. For the no feedback case, k(j) = ∅ for all j ≥ 1.
The transmitter encodes message w over M blocks. The transmitted signal at j-th instant, x(j) can be written as
x(j) = fj(w, k
j−1), (5)
where fj is the encoding function used at time j. We assume the input signals satisfy an average power constraint
such that
1
NM
NM∑
j=1
E
[∣∣fj (w,Kj−1)∣∣2] ≤ Pt (6)
for all w ∈ W, where W is the message set. Here, the expectation is taken over Kj−1 = [K(1), . . . ,K(j − 1)],
where K(j) is the random variable denoting the feedback signal sent at j-th instant . The channels depicted in
Figure 1 are memoryless i.e.,
p
(
yN (i), zN (i)|xNi, gim, gie, giz, kN(i−1), φi
)
= p
(
yN (i), zN (i)|xN (i), gm(i), ge(i), gz(i), φ(i)
)
(7)
= p
(
yN (i)|xN (i), gm(i), gz(i), φ(i)
)×
p
(
zN (i)|xN (i), ge(i), φ(i)
)
, (8)
where (7) follows form the memoryless property and (8) follows from the fact that the additive noise components
in yN (i) and zN (i) are independent. Adversary strategy φ(i) changes arbitrarily from one block to the next. Here,
the conditional pdfs p
(
yN (i)|xN (i), gm(i), gz(i), φ(i)
)
and p
(
zN (i)|xN (i), ge(i), φ(i)
)
are governed by the signal
models of the main channel (1) and the eavesdropper channel (2), respectively.
The transmitter aims to send message w ∈W = {1, 2, . . . 2NMRs} to the receiver over M blocks with rate Rs.
By employing a
(
2NMRs , NM
)
code, the encoder at the transmitter maps message w to a codeword xNM , and
the decoder at the receiver, d(·) maps the received sequence Y NM to wˆ ∈ W. The average error probability of a
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5(
2NMRs , NM
)
code is defined as
PNMe = 2
−NMRs
∑
w∈W
P
(
d
(
Y NM
) 6= w|w was sent) (9)
The secrecy of a transmitted message, w is measured by the equivocation rate at the adversary, which is equal
to the entropy rate of the transmitted message conditioned on the adversary’s observations.
Definition 1. A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable if, for any  > 0, there exists a sequence of length NM
channel codes and sets AM for which the following are satisfied under any strategy of the adversary, φM :
PNMe ≤ , (10)
1
MN
H
(
W |ZMN ,KMN , gM , φM) ≥ Rs − , (11)
for sufficiently large N and M and for any gM =
[
gMm , g
M
e , g
M
z
] ∈ AM such that P[AM ] ≥ 1− .
Note that KMN = ∅ for the no feedback case. The secrecy capacity is defined to be the supremum of the
achievable rates. The secrecy capacities for the no feedback and 1-bit feedback case are denoted as Cs and C1-bits ,
respectively. Our goal is to find secrecy rates, Rs that are achievable under any strategy of the adversary and find
the cases in which they are tight.
III. NO FEEDBACK
In this section, we provide bounds to the secrecy capacity for the no feedback case and evaluate the capacity
for special cases. In the sequel, we provide a number of remarks under which we provide the basic insights drawn
from the results.
Theorem 1. (Secrecy capacity bounds for the no feedback case) The secrecy capacity, Cs is bounded by
C−s ≤ Cs ≤ C+s (12)
where
C−s =
[
E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log (1 + PtHe)
] ]+
(13)
C+s = min
pH˜m,H˜e,H˜z
E
(log(1 + PtH˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
(
1 + PtH˜e
))+ (14)
subject to : pH˜m,H˜z = pHm,Hz , pH˜e = pHe
2
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Fig. 2. Achievability strategy described in the proof sketch of Theorem 1.
Notice that in Theorem 1, the positive operator,1 [·]+ is outside the expectation in the lower bound, whereas it
is inside the expectation in the upper bound. In the upper bound, minimization is over the all possible joint pdfs,
pH˜m,H˜e,H˜z that satisfy the following constraints pH˜m,H˜z = pHm,Hz and pH˜e = pHe . Here, there is no constraint
on the dependency of
(
H˜m, H˜z
)
and H˜e. Note that if Pj = 0 in Theorem 1, then new bounds are valid for the
scenario in which the adversary always eavesdrops the main channel, which is a common scenario in the literature.
The complete proofs for the lower bound and the upper bound in Theorem 1 are available in Appendix A. Here,
we provide a proof sketch for the lower bound. We consider the impact of the adversary’s arbitrary strategy on both
the probability error and secrecy. The secrecy encoder, depicted in Figure 2, maps message w ∈ {1, . . . , 2NMC−s }
to randomized message m ∈ {1, . . . , 2NMRm} as in [1]. The channel encoder, illustrated in Figure 2, employs
codebook c, where the codebook contains 2NMRm independently and identically generated codewords, xNM of
length NM . The channel encoder maps randomized message m to one of the codewords in c. The probability
law of the main channel is p
(
yN (i)|xN (i), gm(i), gz(i), φ(i)
)
, where φ(i) changes from one block to the next
arbitrarily. To remove the arbitrary nature of the main channel, the decoder artificially generates a noise sequence
drawn from CN (0, hzPjIN×N ), where hz is picked from Hz(i), and adds the noise sequence to it’s received signal
yN (i) when the adversary is in the eavesdropping state, φ(i) = 0. Hence, the decoder can employ typical set
decoding [16], which would not have been possible without the artificial noise, due to the lack of the underlying
probability distribution for the received signal associated with the arbitrary adversary strategy. We select Rm as
Rm = max
p(xN (i))
1
N
I(XN (i), Y N (i)|Gm(i), Gz(i), φ(i) = 1) (15)
= E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
)]
, (16)
where the joint distribution of
(
XN (i), Y N (i)
)
in (15) is governed by (1) for a given p(xN (i)), and (16) follows
from the fact that XN (i) ∼ CN(0, PtIN×N ) maximizes the optimization in (15). Therefore, each codeword, xNM
1[x]+ = min(0, x).
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7is picked from CN(0, PtINM×NM ). For the equivocation analysis, the possibility of the adversary eavesdropping
at all times should be taken into account. We need to use a conservative secrecy encoder, designed for φ(i) = 0
for all i ≥ 1; otherwise, we cannot achieve an arbitrarily low mutual information leakage rate to the adversary
with high probability. With the aforementioned techniques, we show that C−s satisfies constraints (10) and (11) in
Appendix A. We now provide several remarks related to Theorem 1.
Remark 1. (Secrecy capacity is zero when the eavesdropper channel power gain stochastically dominates
the main channel effective power gain) If He stochastically dominates2 the main channel effective power gain,
H∗m , Hm1+PjHz , and He and H
∗
m have continuous cumulative distribution functions (cdfs), then the secrecy capacity,
Cs is zero. To observe this fact, let Hˆe , F−1He
(
FH∗m (H
∗
m)
)
, where FA and F−1A stand for the cdf and the inverse
cdf3 of random variable A, respectively. From the definition of stochastic dominance and the definition of Hˆe, we
have Hˆe ≥ H∗m with probability 1. We now show that Hˆe and He have the same cdf the following derivation:
P
[
Hˆe ≤ a
]
= P
[
F−1He
(
FH∗m (H
∗
m)
) ≤ a] (17)
= P
[
FH∗m(H
∗
m) ≤ FHe(a)
]
(18)
= P
[
H∗m ≤ F−1H∗m (FHe (a))
]
(19)
= FH∗m
(
F−1H∗m (FHe (a))
)
(20)
= FHe(a),∀a ≥ 0, (21)
where (18) follows from the fact that FA(c) ≤ b ⇐⇒ c ≤ F−1A (b) with b ∈ [0, 1], and (19) and (21) follow from
the continuity of the cdf of H∗m. Hence, (Hm, Hˆe, Hz) satisfy the constraint given in the upper bound (14). When
(H˜m, H˜e, H˜z) = (Hm, Hˆe, Hz), the expectation term in (14) is zero. 2
Remark 1 is easy to state for the fading scenario in which Hm and He are exponentially distributed random
variables. Condition E[Hm] ≤ E[He] is sufficient for He to stochastically dominate H∗m (defined in Remark 1).
Remark 2. (Bounds are tight if the power gain of the effective main channel is larger than that of the
eavesdropper channel with probability 1) Suppose there exits random variables Hˆm, Hˆe, and Hˆz satisfying the
following conditions:1)
Hˆm
1 + PjHˆz
≥ Hˆe (22)
with probability 1, 2) pHˆm,Hˆz = pHm,Hz , and 3) pHˆe = pHe . Then, C
−
s = Cs = C
+
s . To observe this fact, let
(H˜m, H˜e, H˜z) in (14) be (Hˆm, Hˆe, Hˆz). Then, the positive operator gets out of the expectation in the upper bound,
2Random variable A stochastically dominates random variable B if FA(a) ≤ FB(a) for all a, where FA(a) , P[A ≤ a] and FB(a) ,
P[B ≤ a] .
3Inverse cdf is generally defined as F−1A (a) , inf {b : FA(b) ≥ a}. However, since we assume that A has a continuous cdf, F−1A (a) ,
inf {b : FA(b) = a}.
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8C+s . Furthermore, since the lower bound does not depend on pHm,He,Hz but depend on pHm,Hz and pHe , we can
replace (Hm, He, Hz) with (Hˆm, Hˆe, Hˆz). Thus, the upper and lower bounds become equal. 2
Remark 3. (When the jamming channel gain is not available at RX, the lower bound decreases.) In Theorem 1,
the receiver is assumed to know gz(i). Now, suppose that the receiver is kept ignorant of gz(i). Then, the following
rate
R
′
s = [R− E [log (1 + PtHe)] ]+ (23)
is achievable, where
R = max
pXN (i)(x
N (i))
1
N
I(XN (i), Y N (i)|Gm(i), φ(i) = 1). (24)
Here, for a given pXN (i)(xN (i)), the joint distribution of
(
XN (i), Y N (i)
)
is governed by (1). We can lower bound
R with the following steps:
R ≥ 1
N
I(XNG (i), Y
N (i)|Gm(i), φ(i) = 1) (25)
≥ E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjE[Hz]
)]
, (26)
where XNG (i) ∼ CN(0, PtIN×N ) in (25). The covariance matrix of the jamming component in Y N (i) is
E [Hz(i)] IN×N . In [18], the authors show that Gaussian noise that has the same covariance matrix with the
original additive noise component minimizes I(XN (i);Y N (i)) when XN (i) is Gaussian distributed. Hence, we
replace Gz(i)SNj (i) with CN(0,E [Hz(i)] IN×N ), and reach the inequality in (26). 2
Suppose that the transmitter and the adversary power constraints scale in the same order, parametrized by P , i.e.,
Pt (P ) = O (Pj(P )) as P →∞. We show that the secrecy capacity is zero in the no feedback case as P →∞ in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (Secrecy capacity goes to zero when the jamming and transmission power constraints
scale similarly.) Suppose that Pt(P ) and Pj(P ) are continuous functions of P with limP→∞ Pt(P ) = ∞,
limP→∞ Pj(P ) =∞ and Pt (P ) = O (Pj(P )) as P →∞. When the power gains of the channels have bounded
and continuous pdfs and have finite expectations, the secrecy capacity of the no feedback case, Cs is asymptotically
lim
P→∞
Cs = 0. (27)
2
The proof of Corollary 1 is available at Appendix B. To prove (27), we investigate the upper bound, C+s as
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9P →∞ and show that
lim
P→∞
C+s = 0. (28)
IV. 1-BIT FEEDBACK
In this section, we analyze the secrecy capacity for the 1-bit feedback case, i.e., the receiver is allowed to send
a 1 bit feedback over a public channel at the end of each block. As we observe in Remark 1, the secrecy capacity
of the no feedback case is zero if He stochastically dominates H∗m , Hm1+PjHz . However, in this section, we show
that the lower bound for the 1-bit feedback case is non-zero for the most of the joint pdfs of power gains.
Theorem 2. (Secrecy capacity bounds for the 1-bit feedback case) The secrecy capacity, C1-bits is bounded by
max
(
C−s , R
1-bit
s
) ≤ C1-bits ≤ C+1-bits (29)
where
C+1-bits = E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + max(PjHz, PtHe)
)]
(30)
R1-bits = max
R
1
E[T ]
E
[
R− log
(
1 + Pt
T∑
i=1
H˜e(i)
)]+
(31)
where C−s is provided in (13), T is a random variable with probability mass function (pmf), pT (t) = P(Dt∩Dct−1) =
P(Dt)− P(Dt−1), t ≥ 1 with Dt ,
{
log
(
1 +
∑t
i=1
PtHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥ R
}
and D0 = ∅, and
pH˜e(1),H˜e(2),...,H˜e(T )|T (he(1), he(2), . . . , he(T )|T = t) =
pHe(1),He(2),...,He(t)
(
he(1), he(2), . . . , he(t)|Dt, Dct−1
)
2
The complete proofs for lower and upper bounds are available in Appendix D. Note that the feedback available
at the transmitter in block i, K(i−1)N is independent from the channel gains in block i, G(i) since the transmitter
observes the feedback at the end of the block, and the channel gains change from one block to the next independently.
Hence, the transmission power term in the upper bound is not a function of the channel gains and is equal to
the transmission power constraint, Pt. Furthermore, notice that in Theorem 2, the positive operator is inside the
expectation in (34), that makes the lower bound positive for a wide class of channel statistics.
Remark 4. (Non-zero secrecy capacity) Note that
{
log
(
1 + PtHm(i)1+PjHz(i)
)}
i≥1
is a sequence of i.i.d non-negative
random variables and T = inf
{
t :
∑t
i=1 log
(
1 + PtHm(i)1+PjHz(i)
)
≥ R
}
. If P
[
PtHm
1+PjHz
6= 0
]
> 0, E[T ] < ∞ for all
R > 0 [17]. Furthermore, there exists R ≥ 0 that makes E
[
R− log
(
1 + Pt
∑T
i=1 H˜e(i)
)]+
also positive since
P
[∑T
i=1 H˜e(i) <∞
]
> 0. Hence, we observe that C1-bits > 0. 2
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Fig. 3. Achievability strategy described in the proof sketch of Theorem 2. The feedback at at the end of block i is denoted as k(Ni), where
N is the length of a block.
Here, we provide the proof sketch of the lower bound provided in Theorem 2. First, C−s is achieved with
the strategy provided in Theorem 1 without the feedback. The strategy to achieve R1-bits is as follows. The
secrecy encoder, depicted in Figure 3, maps message w ∈
[
1 : 2NMR
1-bit
s
]
to bit sequence Bl ∈ {0, 1}NM
R
E[T ]
of size NM RE[T ] with a stochastic mapping as described in [1], where l ∈ [1, 2, . . . , 2NM
R
E[T ] ]. Bit sequence
Bl is partitioned into the bit groups {Bl(k)}k∈[1,2,...,d ME[T ] e] each of which has size of NR bits such that
Bl = [Bl(1), Bl(2), . . . , Bl(d ME[T ]e)]. The channel encoder, depicted in Figure 3, generates Gaussian codebook
c of size 2NR, and each bit group Bl(k) is mapped to one of the codewords in the codebook.
To send Bl(k) in block i, the associated codeword xN (i) is transmitted over the channel. The channel encoder
keeps sending the same codeword until Bl(k) is successfully decoded. The channel decoder, depicted in Figure 3,
employs maximum ratio combining (MRC), and combines all received sequences associated with Bl(k). Specifically,
the channel decoder multiples each yN (i) associated with the bit group with g
∗
m(i)
(1+Pjhz(i))
2 and sums them. From
the random coding arguments, we can see that Bl(k) will be decoded with arbitrarily low probability error at i-th
block if the event S(i) ,
{
log
(
1 +
∑r(i)
j=1
PtHm(i−j+1)
1+PjHz(i−j+1)
)
≥ R
}
occurs, regardless of the adversary strategy φi,
where r(i) is the number of transmissions for Bl(k) until the end of block i. If event S(i) occurs, the channel
decoder sends back positive acknowledgment signal (ACK), and the channel encoder sends the next bit group, i.e.,
Bl(k+ 1) on block i+ 1. If event S(i) does not occur, the channel decoder feeds back a negative acknowledgment
signal (NAK) at the end of block i. On next block i + 1, the channel encoder sends the same codeword, i.e.,
xN (i+ 1) = xN (i). This process is repeated until Bl is successfully decoded.
In the derivation for the lower bound for the equivocation rate, we assume that the adversary can observe
the transmissions in the jamming state4. Consider a renewal process in which a renewal occurs when the
accumulated mutual information associated with a bit group exceeds threshold R for the first time. In Ap-
pendix D, we show that 1-bit feedback case can be considered as a model in which secure bits of random size
N
[
R− log
(
1 + Pt
∑T
i=1 H˜e(i)
)]+
are decoded successfully at each renewal point. Here, T is the random variable
4We will drop this assumption when we analyze the case in which the transmitter has the main channel state information (CSI) in addition
to the 1-bit feedback (Corollary 3).
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given in Theorem 2, and it represents the number of transmissions for a bit group. Thus, N log
(
1 + Pt
∑T
i=1 H˜e(i)
)
can be considered as a random amount of accumulated mutual information at the adversary corresponding to the
transmissions of a bit group. Theorem 2 follows when we apply the renewal reward theorem [19], where the rewards
are the successfully decoded secure bits at each renewal instants, i.e.,
lim
M→∞
Rw(M)
MN
=
1
E[T ]
E
[
R− log
(
1 + Pt
T∑
i=1
H˜e(i)
)]+
(32)
with probability 1, where Rw(M) is defined to be the amount of secure bits (explained above) accumulated at the
receiver up to block M .
Instead of employing MRC strategy, the receiver can employ a plain automatic repeat request (ARQ) strategy in
which the receiver discards the received sequence yN (i) when the decoding error occurs on i-th block. Impact of
plain ARQ on the lower bound is captured with the following corollary.
Corollary 2. (Secrecy capacity lower bound with plain ARQ) The secrecy capacity, C1-bits is bounded by
max
(
C−s , R
∗1-bit
s
) ≤ C1-bits (33)
where
R∗1-bits = max
R
p× E
[
R− log
(
1 + Pt
T∗∑
i=1
H˜e(i)
)]+
(34)
where C−s is provided in (13). In (34), p , P
(
log
(
1 + PtHM1+PjHz
)
≥ R
)
, T ∗ is a random variable with probability
mass function (pmf), pT∗(t) = p(1− p)t−1, t ≥ 1, and
pH˜e(1),H˜e(2),...,H˜e(T∗)|T∗ (he(1), he(2), . . . , he(T
∗)|T ∗ = t) =
t−1∏
i=1
pHe
(
he(i)|R > log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
))
×
pHe
(
he(t)|R ≤ log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
))
. (35)
2
The proof of Corollary 2 can be found at the end of achievability proof of Theorem 2. It can be observed that
the lower bound in Corollary 2 is not larger than the lower bound in Theorem 2.
In [15], the authors consider a scenario in which the adversary is a fully eavesdropper, and the transmitter has no
information of the states of main and eavesdropper channels, which change from one block to the next randomly
as described in our scenario. For the case in which 1-bit feedback is available at the end of each block, the authors
employ the plain ARQ strategy mentioned above to achieve the secrecy rate in Theorem 2 of [15]. However, in the
secrecy analysis, the authors consider the impact of the bit groups, Bl(k) that are successfully decoded only in a
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single transmission on the equivocating rate. In this paper, regardless of the number of the required transmissions
for the bit groups, we consider the impact of the each bit group on the equivocation rate with the strategy mentioned
in the proof sketch of Theorem 2. Thus, we improve the achievable secrecy rate in [15] by employing a renewal
based analysis and MTC.
In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we observe that the information corresponding to the retransmissions of a bit
group is accumulated at the adversary, which reduces the lower bound. As we will show, we can avoid this situation
if the main CSI is available at the beginning of each block at the transmitter in addition to the 1-bit feedback at
the end of each block. By using the rate adaptation strategy that we will introduce, the legitimate pair can ensure
that information corresponding to the retransmissions of a bit group is not accumulated at the adversary.
Corollary 3. (Achievable secrecy rate with main CSI) If main CSI is available at the transmitter and the adversary,
the secrecy capacity with 1-bit feedback at the end of each block is lower bounded by
R1-bit+CSIs = max
R
p× E [R− log (1 + PtHe)]+ ≤ C1-bit+CSIs , (36)
where p , P
(
log
(
1 + PtHM1+PjHz
)
≥ R
)
. 2
We omit the proof since it follows from an identical line of argument as the proof of Theorem 2. The only
difference is that the legitimate pair employs a plain ARQ strategy as in Corollary 2, and the transmitter employs a
rate adaptation strategy to utilize the main CSI such that R(i) = R if R ≤ log(1 + Phm(i)); otherwise, R(i) = 0,
where R is the rate of the Gaussian codebook used in the achievability proof of Theorem 2. Since the transmitter
keeps silent on the blocks in which condition R > log(1 + Phm(i)) is satisfied, the decoding error event occurs
only when the adversary is in the jamming state. Hence, the adversary cannot hear the retransmissions because of
the half duplex constraint, and information that corresponds to the retransmissions of a bit group is not accumulated
as seen in (36).
Note that main CSI combined with 1 bit feedback provides the transmitter perfect knowledge of the adversary
jamming state (but with one block delay) since an ACK indicates that the adversary is in the eavesdropping state,
and a NAK indicates that the adversary is in the jamming state in the previous block. Therefore, we do not need
to employ a conservative secrecy encoder to account for the adversary that eavesdrops at all times.
V. MULTIPLE ADVERSARIES
In this section, we study the multiple adversary scenario in which there are S half duplex adversaries each of
which has an arbitrary strategy from one block to the next. We focus on the no feedback case. The results given in
this section can be extended to the 1-bit feedback case straightforwardly. Since there are multiple adversaries, the
message has to be kept secret from each adversary. Moreover, when an adversary jams the receiver, it also jams
the other adversaries. Consequently, the observed signals at the legitimate receiver and adversary s in i-th block
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Transmitter Receiver
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Fig. 4. System model for multi-adversary scenario including two adversaries.
can be written as follows:
Y N (i) = Gm(i)x
N (i) +
S∑
s=1
Gzs(i)S
N
js (i)φs(i) + S
N
m(i) (37)
ZNs (i) =
Ges(i)x
N (i) +
∑S
r=1,r 6=sGfrs(i)S
N
js
(i)φr(i) + S
N
e (i) if φs(i) = 0
∅ if φs(i) = 1
(38)
where Sjs is the jamming signal of adversary s, and is distributed with CN(0, PjIN×N ). As depicted in Figure 4,
Ges(i), Gzs(i), and Gfrs(i) are defined to be the independent complex gains of transmitter-to-adversary s channel,
adversary s-to-receiver channel , and adversary r-to-adversary s channel, respectively. Associated power gains are
denoted with Hes(i) = |Ges(i)|2, Hfrs(i) = |Gfrs(i)|2, and Hzs(i) = |Gzs(i)|2. Indicator function φs(i) = 1, if
the adversary s is in a jamming state in i-th block; otherwise, φs(i) = 0.
For the multi adversary scenario, φM in (11) is replaced with {φMs }1≤s≤S , and the constraints (10)-(11) have
to be satisfied for all {φMs }1≤s≤S . We study two types of multi-adversary scenarios: colluding and non-colluding.
In the colluding scenario, the adversaries share their observations,
{
ZNMs
}
error free whereas in the non-colluding
scenario, the adversaries are not aware of the observations of each other. Hence, for the non-colluding scenario,
constraint (11) needs to be satisfied for each adversary and for the colluding scenario, equivocation is conditioned
on the adversaries’ joint knowledge, i.e., ZMN in (11) is replaced with {ZMNs }1≤s≤S . We use notations CCs and
CNCs to denote the secrecy capacities for the colluding case and the non-colluding case, respectively. We first
analyze the non-colluding scenario.
Theorem 3. (Secrecy capacity bounds for non-colluding adversaries) The secrecy capacity of the non-colluding
multiple adversary scenario, CNCs under the no feedback case is bounded by
CNC−s ≤ CNCs ≤ CNC+s (39)
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where
CNC−s = min
1≤s≤S
[
E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHˆz
)
− log (1 + PtHes)
]]+
(40)
CNC+s = min
1≤s≤S
min
pH˜e1 ,...,H˜eS ,H˜m,H˜z1 ,...,H˜zS
E
(log(1 + PtH˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
(
1 + PtH˜es
))+ (41)
subject to: pH˜e1 ,...,H˜eS = pHe1 ,...,HeS , pH˜m,H˜z1 ,...,H˜zS = pHm,Hz1 ,...,HzS
where S is the number of the adversaries, Hˆz ,
∑S
k=1Hzs , and H˜z ,
∑S
s=1 H˜zs . 2
The proofs of the lower and upper bounds can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 4. (Secrecy capacity bounds for colluding adversaries) The secrecy capacity of the colluding multiple
adversary scenario, CCs under the no feedback case is bounded by
CC−s ≤ CCs ≤ CC+s (42)
where
CC−s = E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHˆz
)
− log
(
1 + Pt
S∑
s=1
Hes
)]+
CC+s = min
pH˜e1 ,...,H˜eS ,H˜m,H˜z1 ,...,H˜zS
E
(log(1 + PtH˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
(
1 + Pt
S∑
k=1
H˜es
))+ (43)
subject to: pH˜e1 ,...,H˜eS = pHe1 ,...,HeS , pH˜m,H˜z1 ,...,H˜zS = pHm,Hz1 ,...,HzS
where S, Hˆz , and H˜z are defined in Theorem 3. 2
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the proof Theorem 1 since the colluding scenario can be considered as a
single adversary scenario, in which the adversary observes {ZMNs }1≤s≤S instead of ZNMs . As seen in Theorems 3
and 4, colluding strategy severely affects the achievable secrecy rate.
Remark 5. (Independence of upper bound from cross-interference) In (38), we observe that the received signal
at s-th adversary includes the jamming signals of the other adversaries, i.e.,
∑S
r=1,r 6=sGfrs(i)S
N
js
(i)φr(i). We
expect that these cross interference terms at the adversaries help the legitimate pair to communicate at high
secrecy rates. However, as seen in Theorem 3 and 4, the upper bounds (and also lower bounds) are independent
of these jamming terms. Note that the secrecy constraint in the proof of upper bounds makes the minimization
of the equivocation rate over the adversary strategies arbitrarily close to the message rate. The strategies that
minimize the equivocation rate in the proofs are the ones in which all adversaries eavesdrop the main channel.
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Hence, the upper bound derivation becomes independent of the cross interference across the adversaries. The
detailed information can be found in Appendix C. 2
VI. STRICT DELAY
In this section, we address the problem with 1-block delay constraint: At the beginning of each block i, 1 ≤ i ≤M ,
message w(i) ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRs} becomes available at the encoder, and needs to be securely communicated to the
receiver by the end of block i. Note that, the definition of secrecy capacity needs to be restated with the delay
requirement. We consider a set of codes of rate Rs where the transmitter maps message w(i), and the previously
transmitted signals5 {xN (j)}i−1j=1 to xN (i), and the decoder maps the received sequence yN (i) to wˆ(i). The error
event is defined as
E(i) , {W (i) 6= Wˆ (i)}. (44)
When w(i) cannot be communicated reliably or securely at block i, secrecy outage event occurs. The secrecy outage
event (with parameter ) at block i is defined as
Osec(i, ) , Oinf(i, ) ∪ Oeq(i, ), (45)
where information outage occurs if accumulated mutual information on the message W (i) remains below its entropy
rate
Oinf(i, ) ,
{
1
N
I
(
W (i);Y iN
)
< Rs − 
}
, (46)
and the equivocation outage occurs if the equivocation rate6 of message w(i) is less than Rs − 
Oeq(i, ) ,
{
1
N
H
(
W (i)|ZNM ,WM\W (i), gM) < Rs − } . (47)
Definition 2. [20] Rate Rs is achievable securely with at most α probability of secrecy outage if, for any fixed
 > 0, there exists a sequence of codes of rate no less than Rs such that, for all large enough N , M1 and M2
such that M = M1M2, the conditions
P(E(i)|O¯sec(i, )) <  (48)
P(Osec(i, )) < α+  (49)
are satisfied for all i such that i > M1, and for all possible adversary strategies φM .
5Note that, the encoded signal xN (i) also depends on the previously transmitted signals {xN (j)}i−1j=1. It is required to utilize secrecy banking
argument [20], in which shared secrets are stored to be utilized in later blocks.
6Although the messages {W (i)}Mi=1 are mutually independent, they may be dependent conditioned on eavesdroppers’ received signal ZNM ,
therefore equivocation expression includes conditioning on WM\W (i).
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The secrecy capacity with α outage is the supremum of such achievable secrecy rates. We use Csd(α) to denote
α-outage secrecy capacity under no feedback, and use C1-bitsd (α) to denote α-outage secrecy capacity under 1-bit
feedback at the end of each block.
Note that we do not impose a secrecy outage constraint on the first M1 blocks, which is referred to as an
initialization phase, used to generate initial common randomness between the legitimate nodes. Note that this phase
only needs to appear once in the communication lifetime of that link. In other words, when a session (which consists
of M blocks) between the associated nodes is over, they would have sufficient number of common key bits for the
subsequent session, and would not need to initiate the initialization step again [20].
Theorem 5. (Time sharing lower bound for α-outage secrecy capacity) For no feedback, Csd(α) ≥ C−sd(α), where
C−sd(α) = max
γ,R˜s,Rs
Rs (50)
subject to:
P
({
(1− γ) log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
)
≥ R˜s
}⋂{[
R˜s − (1− γ) log(1 + PtHe)
]+
≥ Rs −Rr0
})
≥ 1− α (51)
Rs ≤ R˜s, Rr0 = γC−s , γ ∈ [0, 1], (52)
where C−s is provided in (13). 2
Similarly, for 1-bit feedback, α-outage secrecy capacity is lower bounded by C−1-bitsd (α), where C
−1-bit
sd
(α) is in
the form (50-52), except Rr0 is replaced with Rr1 = γC−1-bits .
Here, we provide a sketch of achievability. The complete proof is in Appendix E. In Theorem 5, γ ∈ [0, 1] is
the time-sharing parameter. We utilize the first γN channel uses of each block to generate keys using the scheme
described in proof of Theorem 1. Using a code (2NM1Rr0 , γNM1), we can generate NM1Rr0 secret key bits at
the end of every M1 blocks, where Rr0 ≤ γC−s . These key bits are stored at the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver, to help secure the delay sensitive messages in the following M1 blocks. We utilize the rest of the channel
(N(1 − γ) channel use at each block) to send the delay constraint message. At each block i, i > M1, message
w(i) of size NRs bits is divided to two independent messages w1(i) and w2(i), of sizes NRr0 and N(Rs−Rr0),
respectively. Message w1(i) is secured via a one-time pad with the stored keys. Message w2(i) is secured with an
additional randomization and the one-time padded message. With the following remark, we demonstrate the relation
of the secrecy capacity with a delay constraint and the secrecy capacity without a delay constraint.
Remark 6. (Non-zero delay limited secrecy capacity) Suppose that H∗m =
PtHm
1+PjHz
has a strictly monotone cdf and
P(H∗m 6= 0) > 0. If α ∈ (0, 1] and C−s > 0, then Csd(α) > 0. We can observe this fact by setting R˜s = Rs = Rr0
in Theorem 5. Furthermore, note that C1-bits > 0 if P (H
∗
m 6= 0) > 0 (Remark 4). Hence, by setting R˜s = Rs = Rr1,
we can get C1-bitsd (α) > 0 for any α ∈ (0, 1].
2
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VII. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate our main results. We compare the secrecy
capacity lower and upper bounds of the no feedback case with the lower bound of the secrecy capacity with 1-bit
feedback. To evaluate the effect of delay constraint, we also plot the lower bound of the α-outage secrecy capacity
with no feedback and 1-bit feedback. We consider that the power gains of the main, eavesdropper, and jamming
channels independently follow an exponential distribution.
In Figure 5, we fix the outage term α = 0.2 and jamming power Pj = 1, and we plot the secrecy capacity
bounds as a function of the transmission power constraint, Pt. We take E[Hm] = 5, E[He] = 2, and E[Hz] = 2.
A notable observation is that the lower bound for the no feedback case in Theorem 1 decreases with Pt beyond a
certain point. The reason is that the lower bound, given in Theorem 1 is not always an increasing function of Pt
since the positive operator is outside of the expectation term. The lower bound to the α-outage capacity without
feedback, given in Theorem 5 also decreases with Pt since the achievabilitiy strategy employs a key generation
step in which keys are generated with the strategy used in the achievability proof of Theorem 1 . Let us replace
Pt in the lower bounds with dummy variable P . We conclude that the lower bounds in Theorems 1 and 5 can be
further tightened by maximizing them over P ∈ [0, Pt]. From Figure 5, we observe that the secrecy capacity with
1-bit feedback is twice as large as that with no feedback at Pt/Pj = 10.
We now numerically illustrate Remark 4, i.e., even when the eavesdropper channel is better on average, we can
achieve non-zero secrecy rates with the 1-bit feedback. We take E[Hm] = 1, E[He] = 2, and E[Hz] = 1, i.e., the
eavesdropper channel stochastically dominates the effective main channel. As seen in Figure 6, we observe that
1-bit feedback sent at the end of each block is sufficient to make the secrecy capacity non-zero. Furthermore, we
observe that the secrecy capacity of the no feedback case is zero (Remark 1). The importance of the feedback can
also be seen in the delay limited set-up, where no feedback strategy results in a zero achievable rate as opposed to
the strategy employing 1-bit feedback.
We illustrate Corollary 1 in Figure 7. For each plot in Figure 7, we keep the ratio of transmission power constraint
and adversary power same, and we increase the jamming power. As mentioned in Corollary 1, in Figure 7, we
observe that the secrecy capacity with no feedback goes to zero, when the transmission power constraint and
adversary power increase in the same order.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We study the impact of a hybrid adversary, that arbitrarily jams or eavesdrops at a given block, on the secrecy
capacity of point to point Gaussian block fading channels. We illustrate the necessity of receiver-to-transmitter
feedback by considering two cases: 1) no feedback and 2) 1-bit feedback at the end of each block. For both cases,
we bound the secrecy capacities. We show that, without any feedback, the secrecy capacity is zero if the eavesdropper
channel power gain stochastically dominates the effective main channel power gain. We also observe that, the secrecy
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Fig. 5. The comparison of the lower and upper bounds of the no feedback case with the lower bound of the 1-bit feedback case with E[Hm] = 5,
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Fig. 6. The comparison of the lower and upper bounds of the no feedback case with the lower bound of the 1-bit feedback case with E[Hm] = 1,
E[He] = 2, and E[Hz ] = 1.
capacity vanishes asymptotically when the transmit power constraint and jamming power increase in the same order.
However, even with 1-bit receiver feedback at the end of each block, the secrecy capacity is non-zero for the wide
class of channel statistics as described in Remark 4. We also analyze the effects of multiple colluding/non-colluding
adversaries and delay. We show that, with no feedback, multiple adversaries can hurt the secrecy capacity even
more, as the secrecy capacity bounds are not affected by the cross-interference across the adversaries. Finally, we
provide a novel time-sharing approach for the delay limited setting, and we show that α-outage secrecy capacity is
positive whenever the secrecy capacity without any delay limitation is positive (Remark 6).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Codebook Generation: Pick Rs = C−s and Rm = E
[
log
(
1 + PtHm1+PjHz
)]
− for some  > 0. Generate codebook
c containing independently and identically generated codewords xNMl , l ∈ [1 : 2NMRm ], each of which are drawn
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from
∏NM
k=1 pX(xlk). Here, pX(x) is the probability density function of complex Gaussian random variable with
zero mean and variance Pt.
Encoding: To send message w ∈ [1 : 2NMRs ], the secrecy encoder draws index l from the uniform distri-
bution whose sample space is
[
(w − 1)2NM(Rm−Rs) + 1 : w2NM(Rm−Rs)]. The channel encoder then transmits
corresponding codeword, xNMl .
Decoding: Let yNM be the received sequence. If the adversary is in the eavesdropping state, i.e, φ(i) = 0, the
channel decoder draws gz(i) from Gz(i) and a noise sequence sNj (i) from S
N
j (i) to obtain
yˆN (i) = yN (i) + gz(i)s
N
j (i).
The channel decoder looks for a unique message w ∈ [1 : 2NMRs ] such that (xNMl , (yˆNM , gMm , gMz )) ∈ ANM ,
where ANM
(
XN , (Yˆ N , Gm, Gz)
)
is the set of jointly typical
(
xNM , (yˆNM , gMm , g
M
e )
)
sequences with
Yˆ N = GmX
N +GzS
N
j + S
N
m (53)
Analysis of the probability error and secrecy: Random coding argument is used to show that there exists sequences
of codebooks that satisfy the constraint (10) and (11) simultaneously. Since Rm < 1N I
(
XN ; Yˆ N , GMm , G
M
z
)
=
E
[
log
(
1 + PtHm1+PjHz
)]
, by the channel coding theorem [16], we have EC(PNM (C)) → 0 as M → ∞, where the
expectation is over all random codebooks. We show below that EC [Re(C)]→ Rs as M →∞, where
EC [Re(C)] = H(W |ZNM , gM ,C).
Hence, there exists a sequences of codebooks that satisfy both (10) and (11) since we have
EC
[
PNM (C) +Re(C)
]→ Rs as M → 0.
For the secrecy analysis, let’s define ZˆN (i) = XN (i)ge(i) + SNe (i), 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M . The equivocation analysis
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averaged over codebooks is as follows.
MNRe(C) = H(W |ZNM , gM ,C)
= H(W |ZNM , hMe ,C)
(a)
≥ H(W |ZˆNM , gMe ,C)
= H(W,XNM |ZˆNM , hMe ,C)−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
= H(XNM |ZˆNM , hMe ,C) +H(W |XNM , ZˆNM , gMe ,C)
−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
≥ H(XNM |ZˆNM , hMe ,C) +H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
= H(XNM |hMe )− I(XNM ; ZˆNM |hMe ,C)
+H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
(b)
= MNRm − I(XNM ; ZˆNM |gMe ,C)
−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
≥MNRm − I(XNM ,C; ZˆNM |gMe , )
−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
(c)
= MNRm − I(XNM ; ZˆNM |gMe )
−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
≥MNRm −N
M∑
i=1
log(1 + Pthe(i))
−H(XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C)
where (a) follows from the fact that W → ZNM , GMe → GMm , GMz forms a Markov chain, (b) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces the entropy, (c) follows from the fact that codeword XNM is uniformly distributed
over a set of size 2NMRm , and (d) follows from the fact that
C→ XNM → ZˆNM (54)
forms Markov chain. We continue with the following steps.
1
MN
H
(
W |ZNM , gMe ,C
)
≥ Rm −
M∑
i=1
1
M
log(1 + Pthe(i))
− 1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C
)
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(e)
≥ Rm − E [log(1 + PtHe)]− 1
− 1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNM ,W, gMe ,C
)
(f)
≥ Rm − E [log(1 + PtHe)]− 1 − 2
= Rs − − 3,
where 3 = 1 + 2. Here, for any 1 > 0, (e) is satisfied for any hMe ∈ BM with Pr[BM ] = 1 and for sufficiently
large M since
lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
i=1
log(1 + PtHe(i)) = E [log(1 + PtHe)]
with probability 1, and (f) follows from the Fano’s inequality. Let’s define Rme , Rm − Rs and ENM ,
EC
[
P
(
XNM 6= XˆNM |W = w, hMe ,C
)]
, where XˆNM = g(ZˆNM , gMe ,W = w,C = c) is the estimation of
the codeword XNM .
1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNM ,W = w, gMe ,C
)
≤ ENMRme + 1
MN
H(ENM ) (55)
≤ 2 (56)
Here, for any 2 > 0 and w ∈ [1 : 2NMRs ], (56) is satisfied for sufficiently large M . The reason is that since
Rme = I(X
N , ZˆN |He)− , ENM → 0 as M →∞ from the random coding argument [16]. 2
We now provide the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 1. Suppose that Rs is achievable rate. From
definition (10)-(11) and Fano’s inequality, we have
min
φ(i):1≤i≤M
1
NM
H
(
W |ZNM , gM , φM) ≥ Rs − aNM (57)
max
φ(i):1≤i≤M
1
NM
H
(
W |Y NM , gM , φM) ≤ bNM (58)
for any hM ∈ AM with P(AM ) ≥ 1− cNM .Here, aNM , bNM , and cNM go to zero as N →∞ and M →∞.
Adversary strategy φ(i) = 0, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M solves LHS of (57) and strategy φ(i) = 1, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M solves LHS
of (58). Hence, we have
1
NM
H
(
W |ZˆNM , gM
)
≥ Rs − aNM (59)
1
NM
H
(
W |Yˆ NM , gM
)
≤ bNM (60)
where
Yˆ N (i) = gm(i)X
N (i) + gz(i)S
N
j (i) + S
N
m(i), and (61)
ZˆN (i) = ge(i)X
N (i) + SNe (i), 1 ≤ ∀i ≤M. (62)
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Here, the LHS of (57) equals to that of (59) since conditioning reduces the entropy and the LHS of (58) equals to
that of (60) since W → Y NM → Yˆ NM forms a Markov chain.
We now show that if Rs is achievable, we have
1
NM
H(W |ZˆNM , HM ) ≥ (63)∫
AM
1
NM
H(W |ZˆNM , gM )fHM (hM ) dhM
≥
∫
AM
(Rs − aNM )fGM (gM ) dgM (64)
≥ Rs − δNM , (65)
where GM =
[
GMm , G
M
e , G
M
z
]
, δNM = −RscNM − aNM + aNMcNM , and δNM → 0 as N →∞ and M →∞.
Here, (64) follows from (59), and (65) follows from the fact that P [AM ] ≥ 1− cNM . Note that here, the message
W is conditioned on random vector, GM instead of gM in (59). With the similar steps, we can show that
1
NM
H(W |Yˆ NM , GM ) ≤ NM , (66)
where NM → 0 as N → ∞ and M → ∞. The upper bound, C+s follows when we combine (65) and (66) with
the following steps:
Rs ≤ 1
NM
H(W |ZˆNM , GM )
− 1
NM
H(W |Yˆ NM , GM ) + γNM (67)
(a)
=
1
NM
H(W |Z˜NM , G˜Mm , G˜Me , G˜Mz )
− 1
NM
H(W |Y˜ NM , G˜Mm , G˜Me , G˜Mz ) + γNM (68)
=
1
NM
I(W ; Y˜ NM |Z˜NM , G˜Mm , G˜Me , G˜Mz ) + γMN (69)
(b)
≤ 1
NM
I(XNM ; Y˜ NM |Z˜NM , G˜Mm , G˜Me , G˜Mz ) + γMN (70)
(c)
≤ 1
NM
M∑
i=1
I(X˜N (i), Y˜ N (i)|Z˜N (i), G˜m(i), G˜e(i), G˜z(i)) + γNM (71)
(d)
≤ 1
NM
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
I
(
X(i, j), Y˜ (i, j)|Z˜(i, j), G˜m(i), G˜e(i), G˜z(i)
)
+ γNM (72)
(e)
≤ 1
NM
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E
(log(1 + Ptij H˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
(
1 + Ptij H˜e
))++ γNM (73)
(f)
≤ E
log(1 + 1NM ∑Mi=1∑Nj=1 Ptij H˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
1 + 1
NM
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Ptij H˜e
++ γNM (74)
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(g)
≤ E
(log(1 + PtH˜m
1 + PjH˜z
)
− log
(
1 + PtH˜e
))++ γNM , (75)
where the notation (i, j) indicates the j-th channel use of i-th block and γNM = δNM + NM . Note that γNM → 0
as N and M →∞. In (68), we define new random variables, i.e.,
Y˜ N (i) = G˜m(i)X
N (i) + G˜z(i)S
N
j (i) + S
N
m(i), and (76)
Z˜N (i) = G˜e(i)X
N (i) + SNe (i), 1 ≤ ∀i ≤M. (77)
and H˜m(i) = |G˜m(i)|2, H˜e(i) = |G˜e(i)|2, and H˜z(i) = |G˜z(i)|2. Here,
{
G˜e(1), G˜e(2), . . . , G˜e(M)
}
are i.i.d random variables with G˜e(i) ∼ pGe , and GMe is independent from
(
W,SNMe , S
NM
j , S
NM
m
)
. In a
similar way,
{(
G˜m(1), G˜z(1)
)
,
(
G˜m(2), G˜z(2)
)
, . . . ,
(
G˜m(M), G˜z(M)
)}
are i.i.d random vectors with(
G˜m(i), G˜z(i)
)
∼ pGm,Gz , and
(
GMm , G
M
z
)
are independent from
(
W,SNMe , S
NM
j , S
NM
m
)
.
For the derivation above, (a) follows from the fact
(
W,ZNM , GMe
)
and
(
W,Y NM , GMe
)
have the same joint pdf
with
(
W, Z˜NM , G˜Me
)
and
(
W, Y˜ NM , G˜Me
)
, respectively. Furthermore, note that W → ZˆNM , GMe → GMm , GMz
and W → Z˜NM , G˜Me → G˜Mm , G˜Mz form Markov chain. In a similar way, W → Yˆ NM , GMm , GMz → GMe and W →
Y˜ NM , G˜Mm , G˜
M
z → G˜Me form Markov chain. (b) follows from the fact that W → XNM , Z˜NM , G˜Mm , G˜Me , G˜Mz →
Y˜ NM forms a Markov chain. (c) and (d) follows from the memoryless property of the channel and from the fact
conditioning reduces the entropy.
The power constraint in (6) implies that 1NM
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 E
[|X(i, j)|2] ≤ Pt, where the expectation is taken over
W . Also, note that G˜(i) =
[
G˜m(i), G˜e(i), G˜z(i)
]
and X(i, j) are independent random variables. Define Ptij ,
E
[|X(i, j)|2] = E [|X(i, j)|2|G˜(i) = g(i)]. Then, (e) follows from the fact that Gaussian distribution maximizes
the conditional mutual information [3]. In (74), (f) follows from the fact that
(
log(1 + Ptijx)− log(1 + Ptijy)
)+
is a concave function of Ptij for any x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0 and from Jensen’s inequality. Finally, (g) follows from the
fact that (log(1 + Px)− log(1 + Py))+ is a non-decreasing function in P for any x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. . 2
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We have the following analysis:
lim
P→∞
C+s (78)
≤ lim
P→∞
E
[(
log
(
1 +
Pt(P )Hm
1 + Pj(P )Hz
)
− log (1 + Pt(P )He)
)+]
(a)
= E
[
lim
P→∞
(
log
(
1 +
Pt(P )Hm
1 + Pj(P )Hz
)
− log (1 + Pt(P )He)
)+]
August 29, 2018 DRAFT
24
= 0. (79)
Here, (a) follows from the dominant convergence theorem. To apply dominant convergence theorem, we need to
show that
gP (Hm, He, Hz) =
(
log
(
1 +
Pt(P )Hm
1 + Pj(P )Hz
)
− log (1 + Pt(P )He)
)+
(80)
is upper and lower bounded by random variables that have a finite expectation. Note that gP (Hm, He, Hz) is lower
bounded by zero and upper bounded by log
(
1 + Pt(P )HmPj(P )Hz
)
with probability 1.
Since Pt (P ) = O (Pj(P )) as P →∞, there exists finite B and p0 such that Pt(P ) ≤ B×Pj(P ) for all P > p0.
We now show that E[gP (Hm, He, Hz)] has a finite expectation for all P > po with the following analysis:
E[gP (Hm, He, Hz)] ≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
BHm
Hz
)]
(81)
= E[log(Hz +BHm)]− E[log(Hz)]
≤ log (BE[Hm] + E[Hz])− E[log(Hz)] (82)
≤ log (BE[Hm] + E[Hz])−
∫ 1
0
log(hz)fHz (hz) dhz (83)
≤ log (BE[Hm] + E[Hz])−A
∫ 1
0
log(hz) dhz (84)
= log (BE[Hm] + E[Hz]) +A log(e) (85)
<∞, (86)
for all P > p0, where A = suphz fHz (hz). Here, (82) follows from the Jensen’s inequality, (85) follows from the
fact that
∫ 1
0
log(hz) = − log(e), and (86) follows from the fact that E[Hm],E[Hz] < ∞ and the pdf of Hz is
bounded.
Since log
(
1 + Pt(P )HmPj(P )Hz
)
is a continuous function of P , it is a bounded function on the closed interval [0, p0]
with probability 1. Hence, E[gP (Hm, He, Hz)] <∞ for all P ≥ 0. 2
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The decoding and encoding strategies are the same with the strategies used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Therefore, we omit the probability error analysis and only focus on the secrecy analysis. We pick Rm =
E
[
log
(
1 + PtHm
1+PjHˆz
)]
−  for some  > 0.
For the secrecy analysis, let’s define ZˆNs (i) = X
N (i)ges(i) + S
N
es(i), 1 ≤ ∀s ≤ S, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤M . With the same
steps used in the secrecy analysis of the proof of Theorem 1, we can get
1
MN
H
(
W
∣∣ {ZNs (i), ges(i), φs(i)}1≤i≤M ,C) (87)
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≥ Ls − 1 − 1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNMs ,W, gMes ,C
)
(88)
for any 1 > 0 and sufficiently large M , where
Ls = E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHˆz
)
− log (1 + PtHes)
]
.
We now show that, for any 2 > 0,
1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNMs ,W, gMe ,C
)
≤ Ls − CNC−s + 2 (89)
for sufficiently large M . To prove (89), suppose that codewords correspond to message W is partitioned into
2NM(Ls−C
NC−
s ) groups. Let’s define random variable T that represents the group index of XNM . Then, we have
1
MN
H
(
XNM |ZˆNMs ,W, gMes ,C
)
(90)
≤ 1
MN
H
(
XNM , T |ZˆNMs ,W, gMes ,C
)
(91)
≤ 1
MN
H
(
XNM |T, ZˆNMs ,W, gMes ,C
)
+
1
MN
H(T ) (92)
≤ 2 + Ls − CNC−s , (93)
for any 2 > 0 and sufficiently large M . Here, (93) follows from the random coding argument as in (55)-(56) of
the proof of Theorem 1. The proof follows when we combine (88) and (89). 2
We now provide the upper bound. Suppose that Rs is achievable rate. From definition (10)-(11) and Fano’s
inequality, we have
min
1≤s≤S
min
φMj
1≤j≤S
1
NM
H
(
W |ZNMs , gM , {φMj }1≤j≤S
)
≥ Rs − aNM (94)
max
φMj
1≤j≤S
1
NM
H
(
W |Y NM , gM , {φMj }1≤j≤S
)
≤ bNM (95)
for any gM ∈ AM where gM =
[
gMm , g
M
e1 , . . . g
M
eS , g
M
z1 , . . . g
M
zS , {gMfsj}1≤s,j≤S
]
with P(AM ) ≥ 1 − cNM . Here,
aNM , bNM , and cNM go to zero as N →∞ and M →∞.
For each adversary s, the adversary strategy φj(i) = 0, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤M, 1 ≤ ∀j ≤ S solves the inner minimization
problem in the LHS of (94). The strategy φj(i) = 1, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M, 1 ≤ ∀j ≤ S solves LHS of (95). Hence, we
have
min
1≤s≤S
1
NM
H
(
W |ZˆNMs , gM
)
≥ Rs − aNM (96)
August 29, 2018 DRAFT
26
1
NM
H
(
W |Yˆ NM , gM
)
≤ bNM (97)
where
Yˆ N (i) = gm(i)X
N (i) +
S∑
s=1
gzs(i)S
N
js (i) + S
N
m(i) (98)
ZˆNs (i) = ges(i)X
N (i) + SNe (i) (99)
for 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M and 1 ≤ ∀s ≤ S. Here, the LHS of (94) equals to that of (96) since W → ZˆNMs → ZNMs and
the LHS of (95) equals to that of (97) since W → Y NM → Yˆ NM forms a Markov chain. Furthermore, note that
W → Yˆ NM , GMm , {Gzs}1≤s≤S → GM\GMm , {Gzs}1≤s≤S and W → ZˆNM , {Ges}1≤s≤S → GM\{Ges}1≤s≤S
form Markov chains. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of the upper bound given in Theorem 1. 2
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Codebook Generation: Fix R > 0 and  > 0. Pick Rm = RE[T ] − , where T is defined in Theorem 2. Generate
codebook c containing independently and identically generated codewords xNl , l ∈ [1 : 2NR], each are drawn from∏N
k=1 pX(xlk). Here, pX(x) is the distribution of complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance
Pt.
Encoding: Pick M such that | 1MNR∗w(M) − RE[K] | ≤  with probability 1. Here, R∗w(M) is the accumulated
reward at the receiver up to M -th block for the renewal process explained in the proof sketch of Theorem 2, where
the reward at each renewal is NR bits. To send a message w ∈ [1 : 2NMRs ], the secrecy encoder draws an index
l from the uniform distribution whose sample space is
[
(w − 1)2NM(Rm−R1-bits ) + 1 : 2NM(Rm−R1-bits )
]
. Then, the
secrecy encoder maps l into NMRm bits and decompose NMRm bits into groups of NR bits. To send the index
l, the channel encoder transmits NR in each block by using codebook c. When NAK is received, the channel
encoder sends the same bit group transmitted at the previous block. Detailed information about the encoding can
be found in the proof sketch of Theorem 2.
Decoding: Let yN (i) be the received sequence. If the adversary is in the eavesdropping state, i.e., φ(i) = 0, the
channel decoder draws gz(i) from Gz(i) and a noise sequence sNj (i) from S
N
j (i) to obtain
yˆN (i) = yN (i) + gz(i)s
N
j (i).
The channel decoder collects yN (i)’s that correspond to the same bit group and apply MRC to these observations
as explained in the proof sketch. Then, the channel decoder employs joint typicality decoding as in the no feedback
case (mentioned in the Appendix A).
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Secrecy Analysis: For the secrecy analysis, let’s define ZˆN (i) = XN (i)ge(i) + SNe (i), 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M . The
equivocation analysis averaged over codebooks is as follows:
EC[Re(C)] =
1
MN
H(W |{ZN (i)}i:φ(i)=0, gM ,C) (100)
(a)
≥ 1
MN
H(W |ZˆNM , gM ,C)
=
1
MN
H
(
W, {XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM , gM ,C
)
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(101)
≥ 1
MN
H
({XN (i)}i:i∈A|C)
− 1
MN
I
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A; ZˆNM |gM ,C
)
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
=
1
MN
∑
i∈A
H
(
XN (i)|ZˆNM ,C, gM
)
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
=
1
MN
∑
i∈A
[
H(XN (i))− I
(
XN (i); ZˆNM |C, gM
)]+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(b)
=
1
MN
∑
i∈A
[
NR− I
(
XN (i); ZˆN (i− r(i) + 1 : i)|C, gM
)]+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(102)
≥ 1
MN
∑
i∈A
[
NR− I
(
XN (i),C; ZˆN (i− r(i) + 1 : i)|gM
)]+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(c)
=
1
MN
∑
i∈A
[
NR− I
(
XN ; ZˆN (i− r(i) + 1 : i)|gM
)]+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(103)
(d)
=
1
M
∑
i∈A
[
R− I
(
X; Zˆ(i−r(i)+1)...,Zˆi |gM
)]+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(104)
=
1
M
∑
i∈A
R− log
1 + Pt r(i)∑
j=1
he (i− j + 1)
+
− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
(105)
(e)
≥ C−1-bits
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− 1
MN
H
(
{XN (i)}i:i∈A|ZˆNM ,W, gM ,C
)
−  (106)
≥ C−1-bits − 2 (107)
for any  > 0 and for sufficiently large M , where r(i) is the required number of transmissions for the bit group that
is successfully decoded on i-th block and A is the set of blocks on which decoding occurs successfully, i.e., A ={
i : log
(
1 +
∑r(i)−1
j=1
Pthm(i−j)
1+Pjhz(i−j)
)
< R ≤ log
(
1 +
∑r(i)
j=1
Pthm(i−j+1)
1+Pjhz(i−j+1)
)
and 1 ≤ i ≤M
}
. Here, (a) follows
from the fact that conditioning reduces the entropy. In (102), ZˆN (i−r(i)+1 : i) =
[
ZˆN (i) . . . , ZˆN (i− r(i) + 1)
]
is the vector of the observed signals at the adversary that corresponds to successfully received codeword XN (i).
Here, (b) follows from the fact that XN (i) and {ZN (j)}j /∈(i−r(i)+1,...,i) are independent. In (103), (c) follows
from the fact that C→ XN (i)→ ZˆN (i), . . . ZˆN (i− k + 1) forms Markov chain. Here, XN (i) is not conditioned
to codebook C, hence XN (i) = XN ∼ CN(0, PtIN×N ). In (104),
Zˆk , X +Nk, k ∈ {i− r(i) + 1, . . . , i} (108)
where Nk’s are i.i.d and X and Nk are distributed with CN(0, Pt) and CN(0, 1), respectively. In (104), (d) follows
from the fact that
pXN ,ZˆN (i−k+1:i)
(
xN , zN (i− k + 1 : i)) =
N∏
j=1
pX(xj)pZˆ(i−k+1:i) (zj (i− k + 1 : i) |xj , g (i− k + 1 : i))
where zj(i) denotes j-th element of i-th block. In (105), (e) follows from the renewal reward theorem. We can
show that the second term in (106) goes to zero as M →∞ with the list decoding argument used in the proof of
Theorem 2 of [5]. This concludes the proof. 2
We now give the proof for Corollary 2. Since the proof is similar to the achievability proof of Theorem 2, we only
present the differences in codebook generation, encoding, decoding, and secrecy analysis steps. In the codebook
generation, Rm is selected as Rm = Rp− , where p is defined in Theorem 2. Note that p = 1/E[T ∗].
In the encoding step, we select M such that | 1MNR∗∗w (M)− RE[K] | ≤  with probability 1. Here, R∗∗w (M) is the
accumulated reward at the receiver up to M -th block for the renewal process whose inter-renewal time is distributed
with T ∗ and whose rewards at each renewal are NR bits.
In the decoding step, as opposed to the MRC approach, the receiver discards the received sequence, yN (i) if
event Sc(i) =
{
log
(
1 + Pthm(i)1+Pjhz(i)
)
< R
}
occurs. Consequently, the transmitter sends back a NAK signal. The
receiver successfully decodes a bit group on i-th block if event S(i) occurs.
The secrecy analysis is same with the secrecy analysis in Theorem 2. 2
We now provide the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 2. Instead of an arbitrary adversary strategy, we
assume the adversary strategy on a block, φ(i) is a deterministic function of the instantaneous channel gains on
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the block, i.e., φ(i) = f (gm(i), ge(i), gz(i)). Since we constrain the adversary strategy, the secrecy capacity upper
bound for this case is also the upper bound of the secrecy capacity of the original case in which the adversary
strategy arbitrarily changes from one block to the next.
Suppose that Rs is an achievable secrecy rate. From definition (11), Fano’s inequality and the analysis (63-65),
we have
1
NM
H(W |ZNM ,KMN , GMm , GMe , GMz ,ΦM ) ≥ Rs − δNM (109)
1
NM
H(W |Y NM ,KMN , GMm , GMe , GMz ,ΦM ) ≤ NM (110)
for any deterministic function, f : R× R× R→ [0, 1]. Here, Φ(i) = f (Hm(i), He(i), Hz(i)) and NM and δNM
go to zero as N →∞ and M →∞. The upper bound follows with following steps.
Rs ≤ 1
MN
min
f
H
(
W |ZNM ,KMN , GMm , GMe , GMz ,ΦM
)
−H (W |Y NM ,KMN , GMm , GMe , GMz ,ΦM)+ γNM (111)
≤ 1
MN
min
f
I
(
W ;Y NM |ZNM ,KMN , GMm , GMe , GMz ,ΦM
)
+ γNM
≤ I (W ;Y NM , GMNm , GMNz |ZNM ,KMN , GMNe ,ΦM)+ γNM (112)
where γNM = δNM + NM and γNM → 0 as N → ∞ and M → ∞. By using the following lemmas, we can
reduce the mutual information term in (112) to a simplier form. Since Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are similar to Lemma
1 and Lemma 2 of [21], respectively, we omit the proofs.
Lemma 1. For each block i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, we have that
I
(
W ;Y Ni, GMm , G
M
z |ZNi,KNi, GMe ,ΦM
) ≤
I
(
W ;Y Ni, GMm , G
M
z |ZNi,KN(i−1), GMe ,ΦM
)
(113)
2
Lemma 2. For each block i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, we have that
I
(
W ;Y Ni, GMm , G
M
z |ZNi,KN(i−1), GMe ,ΦM
)
≤
I
(
W ;Y N(i−1), GMm , G
M
z |ZN(i−1),KN(i−1), GMe ,ΦM
)
+ I
(
XN (i);Y N (i)|ZN (i), Gm(i), Ge(i), Gz(i),Φ(i)
)
(114)
2
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As in [21], by successively applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can show the following inequality.
I
(
W ;Y NM , GMNm , G
MN
z |ZNM ,KMN , GMNe ,ΦM
) ≤
M∑
i=1
I
(
XN (i);Y N (i)|ZN (i), Gm(i), Ge(i), Gz(i),Φ(i)
)
.
Hence, we have
Rs − γNM (115)
≤ 1
MN
min
f
M∑
i=1
I
(
XN (i);Y N (i)|ZN (i), G(i),Φ(i))
≤ 1
MN
min
f
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
I (X(i, j);Y (i, j)|Z(i, j), G(i),Φ(i))
(a)
≤ min
f
1
MN
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
E
[
log
(
1 +
PtijHm(i)
1 + PjHz(i)
) ∣∣∣∣f(G(i)) = 1]P (f(G(i)) = 1)
+ E
[
log
(
1 +
PtijHm(i)
1 + PtijHe(i)
) ∣∣∣∣f(G(i)) = 0]P(f(G(i)) = 0)) (116)
(b)
≤ min
f
(
E
[
log
(
1 +
1
MN
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 PtijHm
1 + PjHz
)∣∣∣∣f(G) = 1
]
P (f(G) = 1)
+ E
[
log
(
1 +
1
MN
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 PtijHm
1 + 1MN
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 PtijHe
)∣∣∣∣f(G) = 0
]
P(f(G) = 0)
)
(117)
(c)
≤ min
f
(
E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHz
) ∣∣∣∣f(G) = 1]P (f(G) = 1)
+ E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PtHe
) ∣∣∣∣f(G) = 0]P(f(G) = 0)) (118)
= min
f
E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + PjHzf(G) + PtHe(1− f(G))
)]
(119)
(d)
= E
[
log
(
1 +
PtHm
1 + max (PtHe, PjHz)
)]
, (120)
where the notation (i, j) indicates the j-th channel use of i-th block, G(i) = [Gm(i), Ge(i), Gz(i)], G =
[Gm, Ge, Gz], and H = [Hm, He, Hz]. The power constraint in (6) implies that 1NM
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 E
[|X(i, j)|2] ≤
Pt, where the expectation is taken over W and K(i−1)N . Also, note that G(i) = [Gm(i), Ge(i), Gz(i)] and X(i, j)
are independent random variables. Define Ptij , E
[|X(i, j)|2] = E [|X(i, j)|2|G(i) = g(i)]. Then, (a) follows
from the fact that Gaussian distribution maximizes the conditional mutual information [21] for both values of Φ(i).
In (117), (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality and from the fact that log
(
1 + Ptijx
)
and log
(
1 +
Ptijx
1+Ptij y
)
are
concave functions of Ptij for any x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. In (118), (c) follows from the fact that (log(1 + Px) and
log
(
1 + Px1+Py
)
are non-decreasing functions in P for any x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. In (120), (d) follows from the fact
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Key 
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Fig. 9. Decoder structure.
that f(G) = IPjHz≥PtHe minimizes the expectation in (119), where Ix≥a = 1 if x ≥ a; otherwise, Ix≥a = 0. 2
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Fix γ ∈ [0, 1], γ¯ = 1 − γ,  > 0. Each consecutive M1 blocks is called a superblock. Suppose that
communication lasts M = M1M2 blocks. Let us denote xNM1(j), yNM1(j), and zNM1(j) as the transmitted
signal, the received signal at the receiver, and the received signal at the adversary in superblock j, respectively.
Denote xγN (j, i) and xγ¯N (j, i) as the transmitted signals in the first γN channel uses and in the next γ¯N
channel uses of i-th block of j-th superblock, respectively. Signals yγN (j, i), yγ¯N (j, i), zγN (j, i) and zγ¯N (j, i)
are defined in a similar way. Let w(j, i) be the message to be transmitted in i-th block of j-th superblock. Finally,
let xγNM1(j) , [xγN (j, 1), . . . , xγN (j,M1)], and yγNM1(j), zγNM1(j), xγ¯NM1(j), yγ¯NM1(j), and xγ¯NM1(j) are
defined in a similar way. Through this appendix, (j, i) indicates i-th block of j-th superblock.
Encoding and decoding strategies are summarized in Figure 8 and Figure 9. We begin with key generation. Let
Rr0 > 0. At the beginning of superblock j, the transmitter picks key k(j) from random variable K(j) which is
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uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2NRr0}. By using the encoding strategy in the proof of Theorem 1, the transmitter
maps k(j) to codeword xγNM1(j). This process is repeated for every superblock j ≥ 1. Next lemma provides a
lower bound to achievable key rates.
Lemma 3. For any  > 0, there exit N ′ > 0, M ′1 > 0 and a sequence of length γNM1 channel codes(
γNM1, 2
γRr0NM1
)
for which the following are satisfied under any strategy of the adversary, φM1(j):
P
(
K(j) 6= Kˆ(j)
)
< /3 (121)
1
NM1
H
(
K(j)|{ZγNM1(j)}, gM1(j), φM1(j)) > Rr0 − /2 (122)
for any superblock j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M2}, for any N ≥ N ′, and for any M1 ≥M ′1 where Rr0 ≤ γC−s . 2
The proof follows from Theorem 1. Now, we describe the transmission of delay limited message w(j, i)7,
illustrated in Figure 8. Let Rs ≥ Rr0 and R˜s ≥ Rs. Message w(j, i) of size NRs bits is divided8 to two messages
w1(j, i) and w2(j, i), of size NRr0 and N(Rs − Rr0), respectively. We also divide key k(j − 1), generated in
previous superblock j − 1, into M1 equivalent size chunks such that k(j − 1) = [k(j − 1, 1) . . . , k(j − 1,M1)],
where k(j − 1, i) is of size NRr0 bits.
Let ws(j, i) = w1(j, i)⊕k(j−1, i). Suppose wx(j, i) is picked from random variable Wx(j, i) which is uniformly
distributed on sample space {1, . . . , 2N−R˜s−Rs−} and independent from W (j, i). We generate a Gaussian codebook
consisting of 2N(R˜s−) codewords each of which are independently drawn from
∏γ¯N
k=1 pX(xk). Here, pX(x) is the
probability density function of complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance Pt. To transmit
w(j, i) = (w1(j, i), w2(j, i)), the codeword indexed by (w1(j, i), ws(j, i), wx(j, i)) is transmitted.
Error and Equivocation Analysis:
Lemma 4. For any  > 0, there exit N ′′ > 0 and a sequence of length γ¯N channel codes (γ¯N, 2γ¯R˜sN ) for which
the following are satisfied
P
(
(W2(j, i),Ws(j, i),Wx(j, i)) 6= (Wˆ2(j, i), Wˆs(j, i), Wˆx(j, i))
)
< /3 (123)
for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . .M2}, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M1} and for any N ≥ N ′′ when the channel conditions satisfy
γ¯ log
(
1 +
Pthm(j, i)
1 + Pjhz(j, i)
)
≥ R˜s. (124)
2
The proof follows from standard arguments, and is omitted. Assume for the error and equivocation analysis that
7Due to Definition 2, we skip the message transmission at first M1 blocks, and declare secrecy outage.
8Note that in this process, the messages are converted to binary form.
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N and M1 are chosen such that N = max(N ′, N ′′, N ′′′), and M1 = M ′1, where N
′′′ will be defined later. Then,
error probability is bounded as
P(E(j, i)) , P
(
(W1(j, i),W2(j, i)) 6= (Wˆ1(j, i), Wˆ2(j, i))
)
≤ P
((
W2(j, i) 6= Wˆ2(j, i)
)⋃(
W1(j, i) 6= Wˆ1(j, i)
))
≤ 
3
+ P
(
W1(j, i) 6= Wˆ1(j, i)
)
(125)
≤ 
3
+ P
(
Ws(j, i) 6= Wˆs(j, i)
⋃
K(j, i) 6= Kˆ(j, i)
)
(126)
≤ , (127)
where (125) follows from Lemma 4, (126) follows from the fact that W1(j, i) = Ws(j, i) ⊕ K(j, i) and (127)
follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
For the secrecy analysis, let’s define ZˆN (j, i) = XN (j, i)ge(j, i) + SNe (j, i), 1 ≤ ∀j ≤ M1, 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ M2.
Equivocation analysis averaged over codebooks is as follows. Note that all the equivocation terms below are
conditioned on the channel gains gM , and we omit them for the sake of simplicity.
H(W1(j, i),W2(j, i)|ZNM ,WM\W (j, i),C)
≥ H(W1(j, i),W2(j, i)|ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i),C) (128)
= H(W2(j, i)|ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i),C)
+H(W1(j, i)|ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i),W2(j, i),C) (129)
We now bound the first term in (129).
H(W2(j, i)|ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i),C)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i)|C) (130)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i)|C) (131)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C)
− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j)\ZˆNγ¯(j, i),WM1(j)\W (j, i)|ZˆNγ¯(j, i),C) (132)
≥ H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C)
− I(W2(j, i);K(j − 1, i), ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j)\ZˆNγ¯(j, i),WM1(j)\W (j, i)|ZˆNγ¯(j, i),C) (133)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C)
− I(W2(j, i);K(j − 1, i), ZˆNM1γ(j − 1)|ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C) (134)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C)
− I(W2(j, i);K(j − 1, i)|ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C)
August 29, 2018 DRAFT
34
− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1)|K(j − 1, i), ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C) (135)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C)
− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1)|K(j − 1, i), ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C) (136)
= H(W2(j, i))− I(W2(j, i); ZˆNγ¯(j, i)|C) (137)
= H(W2(j, i)|ZˆNγ¯(j, i),C)
≥ Rs −Rr0 −N/2, (138)
where (131) follows from the fact that ZˆNM\
(
ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j)
)
,WM\WM1(j) are independent
from the rest of the random variables in (130) for every codebook. (136) follows from the fact that K(j −
1, i) and
(
W2(j, i), Zˆ
NM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C
)
are independent due to the fact that K(j − 1, i) →
W1(j, i) ⊕ K(j − 1, i),C → W2(j, i), ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),C forms Markov chain, and K(j − 1, i) and
(W1(j, i)⊕K(j − 1, i),C) are independent. (137) follows from the fact ZˆNM1γ(j − 1) → K(j − 1, i),C →
W2(j, i), Zˆ
NM1γ¯(j),WM1\W (j, i) forms Markov chain. Following the same steps in the equivocation analysis in
Theorem 1, we can show that (138) is satisfied for any N ≥ N ′′′ if R˜s − (Rs −Rr0) ≥ log(1 + Phe(j, i)). Next,
we bound the second term in (129).
H(W1(j, i)|ZˆNM ,WM\W (j, i),W2(j, i),C)
= H(W1(j, i)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j),WM1(j)\W (j, i),W2(i, j),C) (139)
≥ H(W1(j, i)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j), A) (140)
= H(K(j − 1, i)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j), A) (141)
= H(K(j − 1, i))− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j), A) (142)
= H(K(j − 1, i))− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ¯(j)|A) (143)
= H(K(j − 1, i))− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1)|A)
− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ¯(j)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), A) (144)
= H(K(j − 1, i))− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ(j − 1)|C)
− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ¯(j)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), A) (145)
= H(K(j − 1, i))−N/2
− I(K(j − 1, i); ZˆNM1γ¯(j)|ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), A) (146)
= NRr0 −N/2, (147)
where A =
(
WM1(j)\W (j, i),W2(j, i),Ws(j, i),C
)
. Here, (140) follows from the fact in (131), (141) follows
from the fact that Ws(j, i) = W1(j, i) ⊕ K(j − 1, i), (143) follows from the fact that K(j − 1, i) and
A are independent, and (145) follows from the fact that
(
K(j − 1), ZˆNM1γ(j − 1),C
)
are independent of
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(
WM1(j)\W (j, i),W2(j, i),Ws(j, i)
)
. From Lemma 3, we observe that (146) is satisfied for any N ≥ N ′ and for
any M ≥ M ′1 if Rr0 ≤ γC−s . (147) follows from the fact that K(j − 1, i) → ZˆNM1γ(j − 1), A → ZˆNM1γ¯(j)
forms Markov chain. Combining (138) and (147), we can observe
H(W1(i),W2(i)|ZNM ,WNM\W (i)) ≥ N(Rs − ), (148)
if R˜s − (Rs −Rr0) ≤ log(1 + Phe(j, i)) and Rr0 ≤ min(γC−s , Rs).
We can observe that α-outage secrecy capacity is lower bounded by
Rs if there exists
(
Rs, R˜s, Rr0, γ
)
that satisfy the following conditions: 1)
P
({
(1− γ) log
(
1 + PtHm1+PjHz
)
≥ R˜s
}⋂{
R˜s −Rs +Rr0 ≥ (1− γ) log(1 + PtHe)IRs 6=Rr0
})
≥ 1 − α,
2) Rr0 ≤ min (Rs, γC−s ), 3) Rs ≤ R˜s, and 4) γ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that the second event in the probability term is
equal to
{[
R˜s − (1− γ) log(1 + PtHe)
]+
≥ Rs −Rr0
}
.
Let’s define set A containing
(
Rs, R˜s, Rr0, γ
)
’s that satisfy these four conditions. The lower bound to α outage
secrecy capacity can be written as C−sd(α) = maxRs,R˜s,Rr0,γ∈ARs. It is easy to observe that if Rs = C
−
sd
(α), the
corresponding Rr0 has to be equal to γC−s . Then, the lower bound can be written as
C−sd(α) = max
Rs,R˜s,Rr0,γ∈A
Rs (149)
subject to Rr0 = γC−s
(150)
which concludes the proof. 2
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